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THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: US AND UK ROLES 
IN THE CREATION OF A UNIFIED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Bruce Carolan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union came into existence in 1992, as the result of the 
adoption of the Treaty on European Union. But the seeds of the European Union 
were sown many years earlier. The "birth" of the European Union as the world 
knows it today occurred with the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951. In this sense, the European Union arose from the ashes of 
World War II. "Less fertile terrain for the growth of the structures of 
international cooperation can scarcely be imagined." I Konrad Adenauer, first 
Chancellor of Germany following the end of World War II, described the 
German city of Cologne in April 1945, shortly before the end of the war, as a 
"ghost city.,,2 According to Adenauer, "more than half the houses and public 
buildings were totally destroyed. . .. There was no gas, no water, no electric 
current, and no means of transport.,,3 Such scenes of devastation were repeated 
across Europe. 
Yet in 1951, six European nations, all historic enemies, entered into the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. Under the ECSC Treaty, 
France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) agreed to relinquish a measure of their national sovereignty to 
international institutions. These institutions could make binding decisions 
related to the operation of the coal and steel industries for the respective member 
countries. The economic, political and social integration of Europe did not end 
(or begin for that matter, as discussed below,) with the ECSC. In less than a 
1. MARK GILBERT. SURPASSING REALISM: THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 
1945. at IS (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Inc. 2003). 
2. Id. at 16. 
3. !d. 
51 
52 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. [Vol. 16:1 
decade, after some dramatic disappointments,4 these same six countries entered 
into the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Through a series of 
Treaty amendments over the next 50 years, the European Economic Community 
has become the modem European Union (EU). The EU, now with 27 Member 
States, represents one of the deepest forms of political, social and economic 
integration among sovereign nations in history. Within a broader European 
context, the economic integration of Europe culminating in the European Union 
has contributed to a sustained period of peace in Europe, a region of the world 
previously plagued by frequent wars.5 
It might be assumed that Britain participated actively in the "birth" of the 
European Union. Although Britain has always stood aloof from continental 
Europe, in the immediate post-war years, British prestige was very high. 6 As 
other European nations fell, it had stood alone against Fascism and Nazi 
Germany. As early as September 19, 1946, Sir Winston Churchill, recently 
ousted as Prime Minister, gave his "Zurich speech" in which he stated, "We 
must build a kind of United States of Europe ....,,7 This sentiment alone should 
have signalled British involvement in European integration efforts. 
Surprisingly, Britain did not participate in negotiations leading to the 
ECSC. In fact, its influence over the course of European integration diminished 
as continental Europe moved forward towards European integration without 
British participation. According to Stuart Croft, "In January 1948, Britain was 
leading the movement towards a closer association of West European 
nations. . .. But by January 1949, Britain had apparently lost the leadership of 
Europe, and the British were widely regarded as being responsible for 
undermining the movement towards European unity."s What accounts for this 
change? And what was the role of the United States in the early steps towards 
formation of the modem European Union? 
From the perspective of modem-day Europe, it can be argued that Britain 
miscalculated how best to protect its interests in the post-war period. In 
opposing continental European ideas about integration in general and the ECSC 
4. These disappointments comprised the failure of a proposed European Defence Community 
and European Political Community. 
5. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) undoubtedly has helped maintain 
peace in Europe, its primary function was to deter the threat of U.S.S.R. aggression. European 
integration has reduced the threat of war among the countries who participated in this integration. 
6. Clemens A. Wurrn, The Making of the European Community - Aux Origines de la 
Communaute Europeene: Britain, Western Europe and European Integration 1945-57: The View 
from the Continent, 6 EUR. REV. HIST. 235, 236 (1999). 
7. ARNOLD 1. ZURCHER, THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE 1940-1958, at 21 (N. Y. Univ. Press 
1958). 
8. Stuart Croft, British Policy Towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of Possible 
Worlds? 64 INT'L AFF. 617, 626 (1988). 
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in particular, Britain placed considerable emphasis on its "special relationship" 
with the United States. The irony is that its stance annoyed the United States, 
and damaged the special relationship that the U.K. held so dear. The U.S., by 
adopting a supportive but "hands off' attitude towards the Schuman Proposal, 
contributed more to the creation of the modem EU than did Britain. The latter 
observation is rarely made in contemporary historical accounts of the founding 
of the European Union. 
II. EVENTS AFTER WORLD WAR II RELEVANT TO EUROPEAN INTEGRAnON 
The modem history of European integration commences with the end of the 
Second World War in Europe, in May 1945, with calls emanating from 
resistance fighters and governments in exile for an integrated Europe.9 Modem 
European integration, leading to the European Union, is generally agreed to have 
been born with the dramatic declaration of French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman of May 9, 1950. This declaration was largely the work of French 
senior civil servant Jean Monnet, who headed up the planning office responsible 
for French economic reconstruction. In his remarks to a press conference called 
for the occasion, Schuman proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The ECSC would pool the resources of the French and 
German coal and steel industries (the traditional industries of war), and place 
them under a supranational High Authority. Other European nations were 
invited to join. 
It is impossible to list all of the significant events leading up to the 
announcement of the Schuman Plan. Churchill's 1946 Zurich speech could be 
perceived as a strong British commitment to creating a federal, or supranational, 
Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, on March 12, 1947, U.S. President 
Harry Truman, in an address to the joint houses of Congress, committed the 
American people to providing financial and other assistance "essential to 
economic stability and orderly political processes."IO Perhaps more 
significantly, in June of 1947, in a Harvard University commencement address, 
Secretary of State George Marshall announced the financial aid package 
formally known as the European Recovery Plan (ERP) that came to bear his 
9. DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
SINCE 1945, at 9 (A.J. Nicholls & Martin S. Alexander eds., Longman Group UK Lmtd. 2d 
ed.,1995). 
10. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, Address before a Joint Session 
of Congress (Mar. 12, 1947) (transcript available at 
http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp ). 
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name, "The Marshall Plan."l] These U.S. developments reflected American will 
to provide the necessary resources for promoting European integration. 
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was formed 
in the wake of the ERP. The OEEC grew out of an ad hoc meeting of European 
diplomats in Paris in 1947 to discuss administration of the Marshall Plan. 12 It 
had the potential for being the source of the development of a federal Europe. In 
May 1948, the Congress of Europe was held in the Hague. It called for a 
European Parliament. 13 This ultimately led to the creation of the Council of 
Europe, headquartered in Strasbourg. 
Allan M. Williams argues that there is no "inevitable causality" in the 
sequence of events described above. 14 The trajectory of events, however, would 
have suggested that proposals for the creation of supranational institutions would 
have emanated either from the OEEC or the Council of Europe. In fact, 
participants in the creation of the OEEC and the Council of Europe had argued 
for these institutions to have greater supranational characteristics; one might 
have expected for a plan such as the ECSC Treaty to originate there. But the 
proposal to create the supranational ECSC instead originated "in the narrow 
confines of the French planning office.,,15 There was little or no advance notice 
16to the U.K. (the United States received at least one day's advance notice of the 
Schuman plan, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson stopped in Paris on his 
way to a ministerial conference in London 1\ Where was Great Britain? How 
did Britain react to and support the proposed Schuman Plan and subsequent 
efforts at European integration? How did the U.S. react to the announcement? 
III. UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
Initially, Great Britain wanted to "assume an active role in the 
reconstruction of Europe ....,,18 However, the British were hobbled by the cost 
of administering their German occupation zone, as they had insisted on the zone 
II. DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 25-26 (Lynne 
Reinner Pub., Inc. 2004). 
12. ZURCHER, supra note 7, at 34. 
13. See Jan Melissen & Bert Zeeman, Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities 
Lost?, 63 INT'LAFF. 81, 90 (1986-7). 
14. ALLAN M. WILLIAMS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INTEGRATION 
26 (Felix Driver & Neil Roberts eds., Blackwell Pub. 2d ed., 1994). 
IS. DINAN, supra note II, at 5. 
16. Id. at 39. 
17. 1d. 
18. ROBERT H. LIESHOUT, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 39 (Edward Elgar 1999). 
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with the largest population. 19 There were other impediments to the British 
playing a lead role. There were deep differences in French and British concerns 
and perceptions, which influenced thinking on the best means to progress 
European reconstruction. Britain was concerned with the strength of sterling and 
the battle against inflation; France was focused on industrial revitalization and 
supporting the agricultural sector.20 There were also deep philosophical 
divisions between the U.K. and continental Europe on the form that European 
reconstruction should take. The French, backed by the U.S., favored a supra­
national approach, characterized by international institutions with powers to bind 
nations. The British favored a more traditional, intergovernmental approach, 
characterized by ministerial meetings requiring consensus decision making. 
The posturing of the French and British governments in the post-war period 
reflected their philosophical differences. The French, in the 1947 negotiations 
leading to the OEEC, pushed for the organization to possess supranational 
characteristics with an international secretariat that would serve as a vehicle for 
promoting closer European integration.21 The British resisted this suggestion, 
and in its final form the OEEC functioned in a traditional, intergovernmental 
manner, with an Executive Committee, chaired by the British, representing the 
real seat of power.22 To add insult to injury, the British appointed Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch, "a Treasury official seconded to the [British] Foreign Office ," as 
first Chair of the OEEC Executive Committee, reflecting subjugation of the 
OEEC to the British Foreign Office. 23 The Americans had wanted appointments 
to the Executive Committee to be at ministerialleve1.24 
This difference in viewpoints is also reflected in the negotiations leading to 
the creation of the Council of Europe. Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri 
Spaak, America's choice for chair of the Council of the OEEC, because of his 
supranational leanings, thought it a good time to push for a directly elected 
European Assembly within the context of the Congress of Europe.25 He invited 
the European Movement to submit detailed plans, and it did. 
U.K. sentiment remained resolutely opposed to any supranational 
institutions, and Labour Party British Prime Minister Clement Attleee opposed 
bringing forth the idea. The resulting "compromise," embodied in the Treaty of 
Westminster signed on May 5, 1947, creating the Statute of the Council of 
19, Id 
20. Wunn, supra note 6, at 238. 
2 I. Croft, supra note 8, at 624-25 (In their arguments the French were acting as proxy for the 
U.S.). 
22. Id 
23. Id at 625 (addition to original).
 
24.ld
 
25. ZURCHER, supra note 7, at 37. 
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Europe, was a bicameral body, but with an Assembly largely devoid of any real 
power. The Consultative Assembly, as finally constituted, could not even set its 
own agenda; the members of the Council of Ministers, which functioned in a 
traditional intergovernmental manner, had to approve the Assembly's proposed 
agenda.26 
European leaders such as German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Paul­
Henri Spaak came to view Britain as aloof and remote from Continental 
European concerns. According to Wurm, "Adenauer remarked that Britain 'feels 
itself to be a neighbour of Europe rather than a European nation. ",27 
IV. U.S. ATTITUDES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The United States was largely absent from efforts to rebuild Europe after 
the end of the First World War. The situation differed after the Second World 
War. Part of the reason for U.S. involvement in post-WWII reconstruction 
efforts was the developing "cold war" and the desire to stem Soviet power and 
influence in Western Europe. The U.S. sought "an economically buoyant" 
Europe as a bulwark against communism.28 It had a vision of "an international 
economic system conducive to free trade and unfettered investment.,,29 
Britain lacked the resources to drive European-wide recovery. The U.S., 
fearful that poverty and misery helped spread communism, took a more active 
role. First, the Truman Doctrine pledged support to defend democracy when it 
was threatened. Second, the Marshall Plan pledged economic support to rebuild 
Europe. However, the United States did not wish merely to respond to a "wish 
list" of monetary demands from European countries. "The United States offered 
to provide Europe with money and goods, but only if the Europeans themselves 
came up with a plan for using the aid, and only if the plan was designed as a 
joint effort rather than a hodgepodge of national requests.,,30 
Furthermore, the U.S. wanted the Europeans to adopt a federal structure as 
a condition of receiving Marshall Plan aid. The U.S. provided a list of essential 
features to Western European governments including free trade, customs union, 
and the reduction of social welfare.31 The OEEC was created to help administer 
U.S. aid but, contrary to U.S. wishes, the organization was and remained 
predominantly intergovernmental in nature. 
26. [d. at 45. 
27. Wurm, supra note 6, at 240. 
28. DINAN, supra note II, at 20. 
29. [d. at IS. 
30. JOHN VAN OUDENAREN, UNITING EUROPE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE POST-COLD 
WAR WORLD 3 (Ronald Tiersky ed., Rowan & Littlefield Pub., Inc. 2000). 
31. GILBERT, supra note I, at 22-23. 
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In addition, the U.S. pressured France to come up with a supranational 
solution to the German problem. In October 1949, then Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson met in Washington, D.C. with "the more important American 
Ambassadors in Western Europe," and pressed for French action towards 
32European integration. He gave them a letter specifying what he wanted them 
to do. "I have in mind," he wrote, "a timetable for the creation of supra-national 
institutions, operating on a less than unanimity basis for dealing with specific, 
economic, social and perhaps other problems.,,33 
According to hi storian Desmond Dinan, "[w]hat the Americans really 
wanted was what eventually happened in Europe not in 1952 but in 1992: a 
single market involving the free movement of goods, services and capital.,,34 
What the U.S. suggested was the type of strong federal system usually termed 
supranationalism. "To locate deep and abiding enthusiasm for the supranational 
principle, one must tum to the United States," according to British historian John 
35Gillingham.
Eventually, France faced a deadline from the U.S. A meeting of Allied 
Foreign Ministers was scheduled for London in May 1950. Secretary of State 
Acheson gave Robert Schuman, his French counterpart, a deadline of May 1950 
36to devise a plan. By this time, it was clear that the U.K. could not be relied 
upon to formulate a plan acceptable to the United States. They had been 
successful in limiting the supranational aspirations of both the OEEC and the 
Council of Europe, and had slowed the continental European movement towards 
deeper integration. Ironically, it may have been the signing of the NATO 
Treaty-representing a type of intergovernmental cooperation favoured by the 
British-which created the policy space for continental Europe to move forward 
without Britain. With the U.S. firmly committed to the defence of Western 
Europe from Soviet aggression, the U.K. became less important from a military 
point of view and, accordingly, less necessary to European integration plans. 
Thus, on May 9, 1950, on the deadline imposed by Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, Robert Schuman made his announcement. Britain was reported to 
have received no prior notice of the announcement, "because of Schuman's 
concern that London would again obstruct a major European initiative.,,37 
32. ALAN S. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-51, at 391 (Univ. Cal. 
Press 1984). 
33. !d. 
34. DINAN, supra note II, at 26. 
35. JOHN GILLINGHAM. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1950-2003: SUPERSTATE OR NEW MARKET 
ECONOMY? 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
36. DINAN, supra note 11. at 35. 
37. !d. at 39. 
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V. THE SCHUMAN PLAN AND ITS AFTERMATH 
On January 24, 1950, a meeting of high-ranking U.S. officials concerned 
with European reconstruction was held in Washington, D.c. 38 The meeting 
contains hints of the growing friction between the U.S. and Britain over 
European economic recovery. 39 Averell Harriman, the U.S. special 
representative to Europe, expressed "the opinion that the British have violated 
their commitments under the Marshall plan through lack of cooperation 
economically with the European Continental countries ....,,40 The minutes 
contain the ominous and prescient comments: 
Mr. Bohlen [Minister, Embassy Paris] said that ever since the war we have 
been putting every pressure on the French to do something or other and very 
little on the British, and that the historic feeling of fraternal association with 
the British, enhanced by our wartime partnership, has led to an assumption on 
the part of this government of the basic correctness of British positions 
without subjecting those positions to critical examination.41 
On May 9, 1950, at 1 p.m.-just a few hours before Schuman's historic 
announcement-a telegram was sent by the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on 
his way to London for a meeting of Allied foreign ministers, to the Acting 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: "I believe it possible that tomorrow, or 
soon afterward, French Government may propose important approaches toward 
Germany in economic field.,,42 He recognised, "the proposal, if made, may have 
very considerable possibilities. It may be very controversial.,,43 Later that same 
day, Acheson sent another telegram stating that he had just learned that the 
French cabinet had approved the proposal that mornin~ and that Robert Schuman 
would be making an announcement that afternoon.4 The text of the French 
statement followed the same day. The following morning, Acheson sent a 
telegram stating, in what would tum out to be an understatement, "British 
reaction has not yet developed but believe it is apt to be somewhat cautious.,,45 
The afternoon of May 10, 1950, John Foster Dulles-soon to be Secretary of 
State under President Eisenhower-telegrammed Acheson in London that "it is 
my initial impression that the conception is brilliantly creative and could go far 
38. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950, VOLUME III, 
WESTERN EUROPE 617 (S. Everett Gleason et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT]. 
39. Croft, supra note 8, at 625. 
40. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 618. 
41. ld. at 620 (addition to original). 
42. Id. at 691-92. 
43. !d. at 692. 
44. Id. 
45. ld. at 695. 
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to solve the most dangerous problem of our time, namely the relationship of 
Germany's industrial power to France and the West.,,46 This enthusiasm was 
characteristic of U.S. attitudes to the Schuman Plan. 
The British did not share U.S. excitement for the plan. A telegram from 
Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the 
British Ambassador to France, Sir O. Harvey, dated May 9, 1950, reveals a visit 
to Mr. Bevin that day from the French Ambassador to Britain, M.R. Massigli. 
The French Ambassador brought with him "an urgent message from M. 
Schuman, regarding a decision which was taken by the French cabinet this 
morning.,,47 The telegram contained considerable detail about the Schuman 
plan. It is noticeably lacking in enthusiasm. 
The minutes of the Third Bipartite Ministerial Meeting in London on May 
10, 1950, contain evidence of Britain's misgivings about French efforts to 
48deepen European integration. Mr. Bevin's comments reveal a British tendency 
to oppose issues by arguing against raising them for discussion. The minutes 
reveal that Mr. Bevin contended, "[t]he question of what body should be charged 
with the general direction of the Western effort might well be left alone for the 
time being. . .. [I]t was premature to take decisions of this kind at the present 
. ,,49Juncture. 
The Third Bipartite was overshadowed by the Schuman proposal. The 
weeks following this announcement reveal the differing attitudes of the British 
and American governments. While the U.S. government wanted to preserve its 
ultimate options - particularly if the ECSC came to be seen as a cartel that might 
damage U.S. interests - it is clear that the government view generally favoured 
the French efforts. U.S. Special Representative to Europe Harriman wrote to 
Dean Acheson on May 20, 1950: "Believe proposal may well prove most 
important step towards economic progress and peace of Europe since original 
Marshall speech on ERP.,,50 
46. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 695. 
47. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS SERIES II, VOLUME I: THE SCHUMAN PLAN, THE 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, MAY 1950- DECEMBER 1952, at I 
(Roger Bullen & M.E. Pelly eds., 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY]. If the dates 
on the respective U.S. and British telegrams are accurate, it appears that the U.K. did receive 
advance notice - albeit very brief notice - of Schuman's announcement. In his telegram to Dulles 
on May 10, 1950, after the full significance of Schuman's announcement apparently had sunk in, 
Acheson revealed that Jean Monnett had discussed the plan in some detail "on the night before the 
announcement", i.e., May 8,1950. Thus, there is evidence that U.S. representatives were "tipped 
off' before their British counterparts. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 694-95. 
48. See DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY, supra note 47, at 7-13. 
49. /d. at 8-9. 
50. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 702. 
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Britain, in the meantime, continued with its tactics of delay. After the 
announcement of the Schuman plan, with its implicit invitation to other countries 
such as Italy to join in the discussions, British Secretary of State Bevin on May 
25 wrote to London's Ambassador in Paris, "I feel that the important thing is to 
get something started soon.,,51 What he proposed, however, would have slowed 
the process. He rejected French calls for an international conference to progress 
the proposal saying, "[a] full scale international conference ... seems to me an 
inappropriate way of handling this affair in the next stage.,,52 He initially 
suggested negotiations about discussions between France and Germany alone. 
He was forced to withdraw this suggestion when informed that other 
53governments already had been invited to participate.
Despite the effort to delay proceedings, events moved swiftly, prejudicing 
the British approach of seeking delay. In short order, the French government, 
anxious to issue a communique announcing the start of negotiations, issued an 
ultimatum to the British. On June 1, the British Ambassador to France reported 
to his Government. He wrote that the French had given Britain until 8 p.m. the 
following day to agree the language of a communique to the effect that the 
conference would have as its "immediate aim" the setting up of a supranational 
authority to govern coal and steel production of the participating nations (the 
language had been changed from stating that the participating countries had 
"decided" to set up such an authority).54 On June 2, 1950, the British 
government refused this request, essentially excluding Britain from the 
.. 55 
subsequent negotIatIons. 
The U.S. government saw this coming. The U.S. Ambassador to France, 
David Bruce, wrote to Dean Acheson on May 31, 1950, "that the British 
Government will not join in the declaration as now drafted.... [T]he French will 
issue the declaration as now drafted and signed by whatever continental 
countries may join, regardless of the British attitude.,,56 On June 2, in the hours 
before the British refusal, Acheson wrote to U.S. Diplomatic Officers in various 
cities, including London, Paris, and Moscow, that "US welcomes Schuman 
proposal as imaginative and constructive initiative in field of Eur economic and 
political relations.,,57 
51. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY, supra note 47, at 89. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 99. 
54. Id. at 129. 
55. Id. at 135-36. 
56. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 38, at 711. 
57. Id. at 714. 
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On June 4, 1950, Ambassador Bruce wrote to Acheson. His comments 
reflect the damage to U.S./U.K. relations from the British attitude to the 
Schuman proposal: 
It is regrettable that [the] UK did not see its way clear to endorse [this] 
scheme at this time by accepting [the] chief principle involved namely [the] 
creation of [a] supranational authority to direct coal and steel pooling 
arrangement. 
One cannot predict how the policy of the British Government may now unfold 
in this particular. ... It is said that its Commonwealth obligations make it 
impossible to adhere as a full partner just as it had been unwilling for the 
same reason to join unreservedly in the operations of the OEEC. 
There are other explanations of the UK attitude all of which probably had 
some bearing on its action. Perhaps the most important point. .. is the 
traditional foreign policy of the UK still tenaciously if somewhat covertly 
cherished despite debilitating wars and diminution of Empire, that assesses 
European politics in terms of balance of power. 58 
A similar hint of annoyance is evident in communications from the U.S. 
Ambassador to London to Acheson on June 5, 1950. Referring to the recent 
British ploy of issuing a public call for "talks about talks" after knowing this had 
been rejected by the French, he wrote: 
Why did the British undertake to challenge French leadership? On the one 
hand they were not prepared to join in the Schuman proposal, and on the 
other, they were not prepared to pay the consequences for not joining. The 
only way in which they could escape from either horn of this dilemma was to 
frustrate the whole project or to recast it according to their own liking. They 
believe ... that a ministerial meeting to discuss either procedure or substance 
would probably produce precisely this effect. 
I believe that our missions in Europe should be authorized, if this IS 
necessary, discreetly and wisely to support French leadership in this matter. 
58. Id. at 715-16 (addition to original). 
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The British may have some good reasons for not participating in the 
negotiations. Some of the reasons they have advanced are, however, I think 
no more than excuses.59 
Thus, the British had mishandled a key moment in the history of European 
integration. British reluctance to participate as a full partner continued with its 
refusal to participate in the Messina conference chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak, 
which eventually led to the creation-again without U.K. participation-of the 
European Economic Community in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The British 
sought to establish a competing organisation, the European Free Trade Area, but 
its members' rates of economic growth failed to keep pace with those members 
of the European Economic Community. Finally, in 1961, the U.K. formally 
applied for membership in the EEC. However, France opposed British 
membership, which was not acquired until 1973. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
How have historians judged Britain's role in the creation of the EU? 
Clemens A. Wurm argues that Britain's influence in Europe was reduced by its 
failure to participate in negotiations leading to the ECSC, and by its later 
withdrawal from negotiations leading to the EEC.6o Stuart Croft writes, 
"although the British were successful in undermining... moves towards 
[European] unity, they were forced to pay a heavy price. Not only did they have 
to abdicate the leadership of Europe, they were also excluded from further 
political developments ... for the next two decades. ,,61 
Philip Thody quotes Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee on his reasons 
for not joining the ECSC: Attlee said that Britain was "not going to join a groutE 
of nations in which we have just saved four of them from the other two ...." 2 
Thody points out the similarity of this comment to remarks made by the fictional 
civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby to his Minister in the British television 
comedy of the 1980s, "Yes, Minister", in which Humphrey explains that the 
British government has 
had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last five hundred years~ 
to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch 
against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and 
59. /d. at 719. 
60. Wurm, supra note 6, at 245. 
61. Croft, supra note 8, at 626 (addition to original). 
62. PHILIP THODY, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 (Routledge 
1997). 
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the Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Italians and 
the Germans ....63 
Is the judgement of history justified? The British handling of deeper 
European integration in general and the ECSC proposal does appear comical in 
retrospect. Britain's empire has declined. The relationship with the 
Commonwealth has diminished in importance. Its actions alienated the U.S. It 
applied for EEC membership in 1961, only to be kept waiting until 1973. The 
conclusions of numerous historians appear correct: Britain made a serious 
mistake in reacting to the ECSC. What is also apparent is that the U.S. made a 
greater contribution to the successful birth of the EU. Its light-touch approach, 
underpinned with deadlines and solo voce instructions to European diplomats to 
support the French government proposals, helped start a process that continues 
50 years later and that, in a broader European context, has helped bring peace to 
a troubled region. Even with the defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish 
referendum on June 12, 2008, the EU will continue in its all-important goal of 
promoting peace in this part of the world. 
63. ld. at 4-5 (quoting Yes, Minister: The Writing on the Wall, BBC television broadcast, Mar. 
24, 1980). 
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